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Mediation and negotiation are related conflict resolution processes. While negotiation usually 
is defined as a process involving the principal disputing parties, mediation involves the intervention 
of a third party. Mediation can be used within the context of negotiation, when the process has 
reached an impasse, for example. Mediation also can be requested before negotiations even begin 
to help bring the parties to the bargaining table. 
This paper addresses one important function of mediation: to facilitate communication and 
understanding among disputing parties. While it has been applied to assist in many types of conflict 
situations, facilitative mediation is of particular interest in the case of environmental disputes, where 
the consequences of not reaching timely agreements can have devastating effects on a regional or 
global scale. In a recent collaborative research study completed by the Processes of International 
Negotiation (PIN) Project at IIASA, eight international environmental negotiations were analyzed in 
depth to determine if it were possible to draw meaningful implications for practice and further 
research.' Several interesting conclusions were developed concerning environmental negotiation 
processes and how they differ from negotiations on other issues. Among them were results on the 
role played by mediation: 
o Several types of actors can serve in the role of third party -- trusted personalities, 
international organizations and conference secretariats, and epistemic communities, 
such as lawyers and scientists. 
o Mediation supported the problem solving and interest convergence processes in a 
positive manner. 
o Mediators functioned to diagnose problems and offer solutions in lieu of or in support 
of the principal parties. They also stimulated communication and instilled greater 
understanding for the issues and national interests among the actors. 
For example, Dr. Mustafa Tolba of the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) 
actively pursued a mediating role during the ozone depletion negotiations by conducting informal 
consultations. Secretary-General Maurice Strong played a similar role in the prenegotiations leading 
up to the 1972 Stockholm Conference on Marine Pollution, helping to motivate the delegations and 
identify areas of agreement and gaps in understanding. Ambassador Tommy Koh served a mediating 
role in the Law of the Sea negotiations and stimulated the formation of helpful coalitions. At an 
organizational level, the Secretariat of the International Atomic Energy Agency played a major 
mediating role in the nuclear pollution talks in 1986 by drafting the agenda and a proposed text. 
UNEP served a similar function in drafting the 1974 Mediterranean Action Plan. Finally, the 
scientific community was called upon to mediate in the Mediterranean pollution talks by providing 
independent fact-finding, diagnosing the problem, and recommending the range of scientifically-viable 
solutions. 
While this paper does not address how mediation can be applied to environmental negotiations 
in particular, it does develop an empirically-based framework with which policy makers can develop 
effective instructions for mediators who support international discussionof environmental issues. This 
can provide a meaningful foundation for additional research toward identifying effective mediational 
approaches to resolve environmental problems and disputes. 
SjGstedt, Gunnar (1992, forthcoming) International Environmental Negotiation. Newbury Park: CA: Sage 
Publications. 
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Introduction 
How can an intergovernmental organization function effectively as a mediator in an 
international or regional dispute? Practically, when such organizations agree to provide mediational 
support in a dispute, they designate a trusted individual or team to conduct the intervention. These 
mediators typically are given instructions as to the scope and extent of their involvement. 
However, the specificity of such instructions is limited in terms of the strategies and tactics 
that can be recommended, because effectiveness parameters are not readily available. Where in the 
theoretical and research literature can such intergovernmental agencies turn to gain advice on a 
repertoire of effective mediational approaches? Certainly, contextual attributes, such as the nature 
of the issues, the situation, and the intensity of the dispute, influence significantly the effectiveness 
of available mediational tactics and strategies. These contingent relationships between mediator 
behavior and successful dispute resolution have been examined systematically by Bercovitch (1991) 
and Carnevale, Lim, and McLaughlin (1989), but their conclusions are at a very formative stage and 
require extensive additional data gathering. Another promising area of research related to identifying 
effective mediation approaches is now emerging using expert systems  technique^.^ Again, this 
research is in its early stages and must be subjected to extensive validation before it can be applied 
to real situations. 
A third grouping in the research literature consists of analytical case studies, such as the 
collections in Touval and Zartman (1985) and Rubin (1983). Such collections and their attempts at 
integrative analysis indeed can provide useful lessons for practitioners on such critical issues as 
mediator effectiveness. They are limited in their capacity to provide broad support though, since their 
conclusions are drawn from only a small sample of mediational cases. Much of the remaining 
literature that is relevant to advise practitioner use of different mediational approaches is highly 
subjective and untested. This literature largely takes the form of personal memoirs of practitioners 
(Dedring, 1991; Pechota, 1972; Ramcharan, 1983; Probst, 1989) and behavioral prescriptions based 
on the attributes of successful mediators (Urquhart, 1985; Dickey, 1991). This literature is 
interesting, but not very reliable in terms of offering recommendations to practitioners. 
Thus, a very real gap exists between the needs of practitioners and what research can offer 
at present. This paper presents an alternative approach to bridging this gap by gathering a problem- 
specific propositional inventory drawn from substantiated experimental findings, primarily from the 
field of social psychology. The results represent propositions that have been tested in laboratory or 
field settings and indicate the likely effectiveness of various mediational approaches under differing 
circumstances. Thus, a practitioner can apply elements of the inventory selectively to current 
mediational interventions, specifying instructions for the assigned implementation team regarding the 
proposed repertoire of tactics and strategies that are likely to succeed. 
To make this inventorying task manageable, one mediational strategy has been targeted for 
analysis in this paper-that of communication/facilitation. Using the typology developed by Touval 
and Zartman (1985), the role of communicator/facilitator is at the most passive end of the mediational 
continuum and is typified in the international context by the provision of good offices. We begin the 
discussion with a description of this frequently used approach to mediation. 
Thomas Milburn at the Mershon Center of Ohio State University and Deborah Kolb at the Graduate 
School of Management of Simmons College are currently conducting research to identify the underlying patterns 
and rules that characterize the adaptive mediational approaches of successful practitioners. They are seeking 
to represent the resulting knowledge bases as expert systems. 
The Provision of Good Offices 
The provision of good offices has been used to positive effect, especially by the United 
Nations and other intergovernmental organizations, in many international conflicts. This mediational 
strategy is typically defined in t e r n  of its role in facilitating communication between disputing parties 
and involves limited action and minimal discussion of substance. Bercovitch (1991) indicates that 
over 38 per cent of all mediation strategies coded in his data base of international armed conflicts can 
be classified as "communication strategies," passive mediational approaches in which the provision 
of good offices plays a prominent role. Its passive nature makes good offices particularly attractive 
in highly sensitive situations. Under such circumstances, it is likely to be viewed as an acceptable 
intervention by the disputing parties because it is not obtrusive. At the same time, it enables 
intervenors to act withlow risk, while enabling them to save face if the intervention fails. 
While the use of good offices, as a legal construct, can be traced back to the 1899 Hague 
Convention on the Pacific Settlement of Disputes, there have been few attempts to inventory specific 
approaches to implementing good offices in particular types of conflicts. A comprehensive inventory 
could be very useful for practitioners, providing them with a repertoire of implementing tools. At 
the same time, there have been no attempts to determine the relative effectiveness of various 
implementing mechanisms. Such an assessment would be extremely valuable in comparing and 
selecting alternative techniques in practical situations. 
An analysis of the good offices approach to mediation immediately presents two challenges. 
First, while good offices are frequently referred to and applied in practice, it is not well defined or 
understood. Attempts to define good offices behaviorally and legally are insufficient; the definitions 
are unclear and ambiguous. The popular understanding of good offices covers a very wide range of 
activities. The definitions do not distinguish good offices from other types of mediational efforts. 
When the literature does identify a case of good offices, an examination of activities performed by 
the mediators often becomes indistinguishable from other commonly understood mediational efforts 
that are clearly not good offices. As a result, we seek in this paper to provide an alternative approach 
to defining the category of mediation that encompasses the use of good offices. 
Second, the literature on good offices is almost exclusively anecdotal in nature. No criteria 
for effectiveness are developed or assessed against particular cases. As a result, it is difficult to 
uncover the implementing mechanisms that are likely to be most effective under specified 
circumstances, on a systematic comparative basis. Consequently, we have focused the literature 
review in this paper on experimental studies whose results have a direct bearing on the effectiveness 
of mediational approaches, especially on passive ones such as good offices. We have pinpointed the 
practical implications of findings in this experimental literature to suggest implementing mechanisms 
that have been shown to be effective in achieving better communication and, ultimately, agreement 
among disputing parties. 
The motives for conducting this research are twofold. First, it extends research already under 
way within the Processes of International Negotiation (PIN) Project to evaluate the effectiveness of 
alternate conflict resolution approaches (Wagner, 1991). The Wagner paper inventories programs, 
procedures, and tactics that have been used or proposed to resolve complex disputes for the purpose 
of future experimentation that will test the effectiveness of these approaches in a laboratory setting. 
Given the growing use and interest in good offices, the comparative testing of these approaches would 
be a logical next step, with the first stage to determine criteria for effectiveness. Second, this 
research will support ongoing discussions concerning the structuring of new European institutions for 
conflict prevention. If good offices is a preferred mechanism for regional dispute settlement, this 
review can offer the range of possibilities for implementation in a detailed and practical way. 
Legal Definitions 
The role of a mediator and of good offices is defined in Article 4 of the Hague Convention 
on the Pacific Settlement of Disputes (1899). Mediation is defined as "reconciling the opposing 
claims and appeasing the feelings of resentment which may have arisen between the States at 
variance." Good offices, a subset of mediation, involves third party intervention which serves to 
bring about negotiations among the disputing parties, through limited action and minimal discussion 
of substance by the third party (Davies Report, 1972). The types of activities involved in providing 
good offices is akin to low-key counseling of the disputing parties-offering a sounding board and 
providing information, but shying away from active intervention that might include development of 
solutions and making substantive suggestions. 
Starke (1989; 512-513) provides the following distinction between mediation and good 
offices: 
Both good offices and mediation are methods of settlement in which, usually, a friendly third etate aasists 
in bringing about an amicable solution of the dispute. ... In the case of good offices, a third party tenders 
its aervices in order to bring the disputing parties together, and to suggest (in general terms) the making 
of a aettlcment, without itself actually participating in the negotiations or conducting an exhaustive inquiry 
into the various aspects of the dispute. Hence, once the parties have been brought together for the purpose 
of working out a solution of their controversies, atrictly epeaking the etate or party tendering good offices 
has no fulther active duties to perform (see Article X of the Pact of Bogoa,. . . 30 April 1948) . . . . 
However, as Starke also points out, the application of good offices in UN practice has 
sometimes been extended beyond this definition. For example, the UN Good Offices Committee in 
Indonesia reported to the Security Council and made recommendations regarding the developments 
in Indonesia. The UN Good Offices Committee for the Korean hostilities was expected not only to 
bring about negotiations between the contending forces but to propose means and methods for 
effecting a cessation of hostilities. 
Erlich (1969) broadens the legal definition of good offices somewhat: 
Good offices in its atricter sense may consist in communicnting to one party the statements of the other, 
if the two parties do not maintain diplomatic relations with cach other; good offices may also consist in 
inviting the two states in dispute to a conference for the resolution of the dispute or for undertaking other 
steps facilitating the two partiea to arrive at an agreement. 
Both Probst (1989) and Pechota (1972) admit that good offices are not easy to grasp and 
classify. They acknowledge the tendency in practice to merge the passive good offices approach with 
somewhat more active mediation approaches. Good offices, then, when initially applied, may be at 
the passive end of a continuum of mediation, but can evolve in practice into active measures and 
participation. Where good offices ends and another strategy begins is often difficult to specify. 
Pechota acknowledges that one of the reasons for the legal confusion over the definition and scope 
of good offices lies in the fact that its usage by the UN Secretary-General is often broader than in 
ordinary diplomatic practice. In fact, as interpreted under Article 33 of the UN Charter, good offices 
can include any conceivable means of conciliatory assistance exercised by the Secretary-General. 
A Behavioral Definition 
Mediation is a process; herein lies the problem with matching legal definitions of good offices 
with practice. While a particular intervention might begin with providing good offices to conflicting 
parties, the intervention is likely to evolve into different forms if the initial intervention is, in fact, 
successful. This evolution of mediational activity suggests that there is a continuum or range of 
strategies used by mediators. Touval and Zartrnan (1985) identify a continuum consisting of three 
categories: 
Communication or Facilitation is at the most passive end of the continuum. The facilitative 
mediator serves primarily as a channel or conduit of communication between adversaries who 
will not even talk with each other. Employing this strategy, the mediator makes contacts with 
the disputants, encourages communication between them, delivers their proposals, collects 
information about the conflict, and provides dispute counseling. Rubin (1983) suggests that 
at this end of the continuum, mediators primarily provide minimal advice and are essentially 
nondirective in their counseling. 
Fonnulation is at the next level in the continuum. Formulative mediators are forthcoming 
in making proposals, reframing the problem and issues at stake, and identifying new formulas 
for solution. They are active in making recommendations and attempting to guide the 
disputants toward making concessions. At this point in the range of mediational strategies, 
the mediator's job is to achieve position movement and convergence; it goes beyond just 
bringing the parties to the table and supports a true negotiation environment. 
Manipulation is at the most active end of the continuum. The manipulative mediator attempts 
not only to suggest and recommend ways of achieving agreements, but actively seeks to 
ensure movement of the disputing parties by introducing the element of power. Through 
persuasive use of their own resources and factors in the situation, manipulative mediators try 
to effectively manage and control the resolution of the conflict. Of course, mediators cannot 
adjudicate and enforce a final agreement unilaterally; that would be arbitration. However, 
they can apply effective pressure and coax the principals by mobilizing threats, warnings, and 
promises that would have an impact. 
For the purposes of this study, good offices fits into the facilitative mediation category. 
Facilitative mediation can be further understood in terms of two continua-passive to active 
and process to content. As the involvement of mediators in a conflict situation expands and as trust 
as well as confidence in them by the disputing parties is enhanced, the strategies employed often 
evolve, from the passive to the more active end of the continuum. The mediator's role as a 
communicator and advisor is then reduced, as it is transformed into a more directive role in charge 
of the collective search for a formula that will resolve the conflict. 
Another distinction of degree along this range of mediational strategies is that of process to 
content mediation (Pruitt, 1981a). A process orientation focuses on helping the parties develop the 
means of communicating directly with each other to resolve the conflict. It seeks to develop trust 
among the disputants. A content perspective highlights the substance of the issues at the core of the 
conflict-how the issues are defined and specific solutions by which the divergence in interests on the 
issues might be bridged. At the facilitative end of the scale, process mediation tends to be more 
emphasized; beginning with formulative mediation strategies, content mediation takes on more 
currency. 
In this paper, we are concerned only with the functions of facilitative mediators and in 
understanding how these functions can be implemented effectively to resolve  dispute^.^ 
The Facilitative Mediator 
What are the different roles that facilitative mediators can play and how can they implement 
these roles? Four categories of roles are identified below. While the roles are distinct, they can be, 
and often are, implemented simultaneously in practice. 
For each of these roles, the experimental social psychological research literature on 
negotiation and conflict resolution was reviewed to identify implementation mechanisms that have 
been shown to be effective in achieving successful outcomes-improved communication or 
agreement-among disputing parties. The mechanisms identified in this literature have been 
substanticued as being effective in systematic research findings-either in field or laboratory tests. 
Together, the results represent a propositional inventory that describe a set of authoritative 
prescriptions for mediators that have been verified through controlled experimental channels. This 
review benefited greatly from three major assessments of the experimental research literature: 
Druckrnan (1973), Rubin and Brown (1975), and Pruitt (1981a). Essentially, we have limited the 
search for propositions to these three sources. Each mechanism is referenced to its source material 
which is cited in the bibli~graphy.~ Historical attempts to apply the facilitative mediation role are 
provided as well by way of illustration. 
1. The Go-Between 
The Role 
Go-Betweens serve as the conduit for information between disputing parties. They take on the 
responsibility of making contacts and keeping channels of communication open. They serve as 
delivery mechanisms for proposals, demands, and concessions. 
Im~lementing Mechanisms 
Associate communication with authoritativeness: The transmission of a message between 
parties through the mediator can give that message a sense of increased authority and 
legitimacy (Krauss and Deutsch, 1966). 
Encourage "staying in touch:" The Go-Between can encourage and reinforce the norm of 
staying in touch with the other party. This can result in placing a positive value on increasing 
cooperative coordination (Rubin and Brown, 1975, 97-99; Bixenstine, Levitt and Wilson, 
1966). 
Educate parties in constructive communications: If the mediator educates the parties in using 
communications to transmit fair and equitable proposals rather than threats and warning, 
successful outcomes are more readily achievable. Opening up communication channels 
While Bercovitch's findings (1989, 1991) suggest that the more active forms of mediation tend to be more 
successful in achieving conflict resolution, the passive facilitative mediation category may be effective early in 
a dispute or in response to particular types of issues. These possibilities remain untested in his reporting. 
' In the following discussion, we refer to the original studies mentioned in these reviews. 
without such tutoring does not improve the chances for agreement, since channels are often 
used to transmit competitive messages. Constructive communications are not induced merely 
by providing the opportunity to communicate, but by identifying how communication can be 
used advantageously (Deutsch and Krauss, 1962; Rubin and Brown, 1975, 94; Krauss and 
Deutsch, 1966). 
Encourage "complete" messages: Detailed and comprehensive messages between conflicting 
parties are more likely to result in greater trust and cooperation than limited messages. The 
complete messages induce a more cooperative orientation (Loomis, 1959; Rubin and Brown, 
1975, 99-100). 
Illustrative Exam~le: Kissinger and Shuttle Di~lomacy 
The archetype Go-Between is Henry Kissinger in his functions as Middle East envoy after the 
1973 war. Kissinger's shuttle diplomacy in connection with the Egyptian-Israeli disengagement began 
on January 11, 1974 (Rubin, 1983). The messages that he conveyed to the disputing parties were 
invested with authority and legitimacy, because of Kissinger's stature and the fact that he represented 
a nation with the resources to issue credible commitments, threats and promises. He was accepted 
as a go-between by the principal parties and was able to facilitate compromise between their extreme 
positions by carefully controlling the communication, timing, and sequencing of negotiation moves 
and encouraging each party to make concessions toward the position favored by the other. Kissinger 
maintained active communications between parties who refused to talk directly and actively requested 
new proposals from each side to move the dialogue ahead constructively (Fisher, 1983). 
As Go-Between, he funneled, and sometimes filtered, information that was passed back and 
forth between the principals, thus regulating the communication between them. When it was 
apparent, for example, that Sadat would accept new disengagement lines but was psychologically 
unprepared to do so because they were proposed by Israel, Kissinger presented the redrawn version 
as an American one to gain Sadat's concurrence (Hopmann and Druckman, 1983). 
2. The Fact-Finder 
Fact-finding is among the most common roles assumed by facilitative mediators. Fact-Finders serve 
as objective information collectors about the dispute. They gather the facts on an impartial basis and 
investigate allegations put forth by the parties. Their goal is to readjust misperceptions that result 
from inaccurate information or a misreading of the facts. 
Im~lementing Mechanisms 
Gather information: The Fact-Finder can collect or ask for information from the disputants 
or others to foster communication (Wall and Blum, 1991). 
Provide objective data: The Fact-Finder can provide objective data about the dispute or the 
situation surrounding the dispute to the parties to improve communication (Wall and Blum, 
1991). 
Quote law and legal precedent: By referring to specific laws, regulations, and precedent that 
relate to the dispute, the Fact-Finder enhances communication (Wall and Blum, 199 1). 
Provide accurate information on each party's position: Accurate descriptions of each parties' 
positions are likely to facilitate compromise the more compatible the opposing positions and 
the less competitive the parties are (Liebert, et al.,  1968; Druckman, 1973, 54). 
Provide information on each party: Parties often infer intentions to the other's strategies 
based, in part, on general descriptions of each party. If the other is seen as sharing beliefs, 
cooperation is more likely. If the other is seen as taking a competitive posture, it is likely 
to yield adoption of a more competitive strategy (Kaufman, 1967; Crow and Noel, 1965; 
Wilson, 1969; Druckman, 1973, 54-55). 
Illustrative Exam~le: Bahraini Inde~endence 
The Bahrain case was a remarkable success story in the political record of the UN (Jensen, 
1985). When the British announced withdrawal of its forces from the Gulf by 1971, Iran, which 
since 1928 had claimed openly in the international community that Bahrain was a part of Iran, became 
actively interested in the issue. Only 4 per cent of the population of Bahrain were classed as Iranians 
in the 1965 census. The Baharainis wished to be an independent state, so when secret talks in 
Switzerland between the two parties failed to resolve the dispute, Iran suggested referring the case 
to the UN under Articles 34 and 35, as a decolonization issue or as a legal issue to be resolved by 
the International Court of Justice. Bahrain insisted it was not a colony and that the question could 
not be considered a dispute between two member states of the UN-the UK and Iran. Bahrain 
preferred that a relevant regional body or a group of heads of state friendly to both sides mediate the 
dispute. The Iranians were against this. 
In 1969, the UN Secretary-General was requested to use his good ofices to resolve the 
dispute. A personal representative of the Secretary-General was appointed to assess, on site, the 
views of the Bahraini people and to undertake this fact-finding mission with complete impartiality. 
Extensive information-gathering through on-site interviews was undertaken. The local population was 
given unrestricted access to the Secretary-General's representative and ensured that they would be able 
to express their views freely. A broad cross-section of the population was consulted. The assessments 
were cross-checked through unannounced visits to outlying areas, until it was certain that the results 
of the report were beyond all reasonable doubt. With objective data thus obtained, it was concluded 
that the Bahrainis were virtually unanimous in their wish for an independent state. Despite several 
impasses overcome en route, it was possible to conclude the issue amicably in May 1970. Success 
was viewed to have been achieved, in part, because of the avoidance of public confrontation of the 
parties in a large UN fora and the compelling nature of the UN fact-finder. 
3. The Counselor 
The Role 
The Counselor serves the role of educator and advisor to the disputing parties. Such supportive 
activities can range from very passive assistance-just providing a presence-to consultations with the 
parties, but stops short of offering proposals for solution. Counselors also function as sounding 
boards for the disputants, and sometimes as confidants, as they assume more of a trusted role. 
Im~lementiny Mechanisms 
Have each party state their own point of view: The Counselor can request that each side 
present its own perspective, position, and interests to the other party (Pruitt, 1981a, 204; 
Pruitt, 198lb; Kerr, 1954). 
State other's point of view: The Counselor can present the parties' points of view. This is 
particularly important when one party is very weak vis b vis the other party in the conflict. 
The mediator thus serves to equalize the power between the parties, making it possible to 
negotiate. In addition, this enables the mediator to explain each party's behaviors and 
perceptions to the other in a limited way that does not yield overinterpretation of hostilities 
(Wall and Blum, 1991; Stevens, 1963; Pruitt, 1981a, 205). 
Be non-evaluative: The Counselor can be non-evaluative and encourage the parties to behave 
likewise (Fisher, 1972). 
Recommend role playing: The Counselor can ask each side to role play how their adversary 
would react (Druckman, 1973, 18; Johnson, 1967). 
Cite dependencies: The Counselor can express similarities between disputants' points of view 
or interdependencies in disputants' goals and objectives. The Counselor can indicate the costs 
of disagreement and benefits of agreement (Wall and Blum, 1991). 
Cite superordinate goals faced by disputing parties: The Counselor can suggest that the 
disputants confront yet additional common problems which would be best solved if they join 
common forces (Sherif, et al., 1961). 
Indicate costs to third party: The Counselor can indicate the costs of the dispute to others 
(Wall and Blum, 1991). 
Call for empathy: The Counselor can indicate the merits of the other party to their adversary 
(Wall and Blum, 1991). 
Praise parties: The Counselor can praise the parties for agreements already reached or for 
concessions and other movements toward agreement (Wall and Blum, 1991). 
Maintain momentum: The Counselor can encourage the belief that agreement is possible by 
working to develop a continuous stream of agreements and concessions by the parties (Pruitt, 
1981a, 205; Pruitt, 1981b; Kressel, 1972). 
Encourage friendly attitudes: The Counselor can encourage friendly attitudes toward the other 
party that enhances trust in the other's good will. One way of combatting negative 
perceptions of the other is to emphasize what is similar between the parties and the benefits 
that would accrue to each by cooperating (Landsberger, 1955; Berscheid and Walster, 1978). 
Limit the scope of issues: The more limited the scope of issues under discussion, the more 
likely an agreement can be found (Druckman, 1973, 18; Deutsch, Canavan and Rubin, 1971). 
Seek early agreement on easier issues: The more resolutions that can be achieved on easier 
issues, the more likely the disputants will continue to seek solutions to the more difficult 
issues (Druckman, 1973, 18; Deutsch, Canavan and Rubin, 1971). 
Reduce public position-taking and posturing: If intensive strategy preparation and posturing 
is avoided, and instead the parties talk about the issues in the stages before the disputants 
reach the bargaining table, agreement during the negotiation is likely to be facilitated 
(Druckman, 1973, 24; Bass, 1966). 
Encourage "fair" proposals: The more parties communicate statements that appear fair and 
equitable, the greater the chances that the talks will continue and not break down (Druckman, 
1973, 28; Druckman, Solomon and Zechmeister, 1972). 
Educate on cultural differences: Differences in cultural and linguistic approaches are less 
likely to impede negotiation if the disputants understand the other sides' cultural proclivities 
or can deal with the other side on an informal basis (Druckman, 1973, 37; Nayar, Touzard 
and Summers, 1968). 
Educate parties on bargaining dynamics: Education on the likely implications of tough and 
soft bargaining, the dynamics of conflict escalation, and problem solving approaches is likely 
to help novice negotiators (Kochan and Jick, 1978; Burton, 1969). 
Encourage reflective statements: The Counselor can encourage the parties to identify hidden 
issues that are preventing agreement, and restate and reframe the issues in a neutral manner 
(Pruitt and Gahagan, 1974). 
Suggest cooling off period: The Counselor can suggest a cooling off period if the conflict has 
intensified, so that communications can resume afterwards in a constructive manner (Rubin 
and Brown, 1975, 105; Carnevale, Pruitt and Seilheimer, 1981). 
Avert and convert intangible issues: Intangible issues, such as honor, face, esteem, reputation, 
and status, can overtake tangible issues in importance, reduce the possibilities for concession 
making, and make it difficult to negotiate agreements. The Counselor can enable the 
conflicting parties to gracefully retreat from such intangible issues that tend to yield 
inflexibility (Pruitt and Johnson, 1970; Kerr, 1954). 
Promise gains for cooperation: The Counselor can indicate the enhanced gains for successful 
cooperation and the risks of continuing competitive behavior. The rewards for agreement 
should be manipulated to avoid a "winner take all" outcome (Kelley, et al., 1970). 
Fractionate issues: Reduce the larger contentious issues into smaller, solvable pieces (Fisher, 
1964). 
Illustrative Exam~le: The Congo Crisis 
The Congo crisis of July 1960 is still considered one of the most dangerous and difficult of 
United Nations operations. It was one in which Hammarskjold articulated the strategies of preventive 
diplomacy, facilitative mediation, and arbitration, but in which he particularly played the role of 
Counselor. 
Hammarskjold continually reminded parties that he would not act in support of Lumumba or 
any other Congolese politician outside the framework of law and order. In the course of his duties, 
he explained the possibilities and limits of UN action, cautioned parties about possible outcomes, 
especially if UN forces were withdrawn, offered and diagnosed extensive surveys of the military and 
political situation for the parties, and generally vested the office with integrity and fair-mindedness 
despite repeated attempts to demean his efforts (Urquhart, 1972). 
4. The Sponsor 
The Role 
The Sponsor organizes and/or hosts fora in which the disputants can talk directly or through the 
mediator. Again, playing a facilitative role, the Sponsor can provide the venue, send out invitations, 
arrange for or exclude media coverage, and chair sessions. 
Implementine Mechanisms 
Establish mediator's presence: The mere presence of the Sponsor-an outsider to the 
dispute-can cause the disputing parties to be on their best behavior to save face and be 
motivated toward agreement (Pruitt, 1981a, 203-4; Rubin and Brown, 1975, 55; Johnson and 
Tullar, 1972; Meeker and Shure, 1969). 
Establish and control agenda: The Sponsor can set the agenda, make procedural statements 
and set ground rules for meeting. Actions can include holding separate and group meetings, 
and establishing orders for speaking (Wall and Blum, 1991). 
Avoid audiences: When an audience (the public, the media, etc.) is perceived as being 
evaluative, the disputants are more likely to be motivated by face-saving considerations, 
thereby overreacting to "look strong." They are also likely to be very cautious in offering 
concessions to ensure that there is internal consensus (Druckman, 1973, 47; Brown, 1968, 
1970). 
Select neutral sites: Site neutrality is likely to equalize power, create symmetry, and reduce 
competitiveness and assertiveness among disputants (Martindale, 1971). 
Maintain secrecy: Secrecy facilitates achieving agreements because the parties are not 
subjected to the pressures of public interpretation of concessions made (Druckman, 1973,47; 
Zajonc and Sales, 1966). 
Encourage face-to-face talks: Face-to-face communications are more likely to achieve 
successful outcomes sooner than indirect talks conducted solely through a mediator 
(Druckman, 1973, 28; Miller, Brehmer and Hamrnond, 1969) 
Create deadlines: By imposing a deadline, the Sponsor produces an early reason to coordinate 
(Rubin and Brown, 1975, 120-4; Pruitt and Johnson, 1970). 
Illustrative Exam~le: The  cam^ David Talks 
The talks that led up to the Camp David Accords are a classic example of the role of Sponsor, 
although elements of the Go-Between, Fact-Finder and Counselor are also to be found. President 
Carter initiated the talks, invited the disputing parties, established and controlled the agenda, avoided 
audiences and publicity, chose a neutral setting, maintained secrecy, encouraged face-to-face 
discussions and created deadlines. 
At a critical, now famous, moment in the talks, Carter emphasized his role as Counselor 
effectively. He reminded Begin (by giving him autographed photographs for his grandchildren) that 
they were making an important decision for posterity, which made Begin adopt a frame of mind that 
allowed him to accept the accord and sign the agreement (Hare and Naveh, 1986; Carter, 1982). 
Numerous creative problem-solving ideas were employed. Carter ceaselessly endeavored to defend 
each of the leaders to the other, stated and presented the other party's point of view, called for 
empathy, pacified the two principals when the atmosphere became heated, encouraged friendly 
attitudes, stimulated the informal exploration of proposals, suggested cooling-off periods, drafted 
proposals and a single negotiating text, and promised gains for cooperation (Carter, 1982). 
Conclusions 
From a very practical perspective, mediators can take advantage of the propositional inventory 
in this paper to develop a meaningful repertoire of facilitative mediation approaches. Although these 
techniques were found to be effective primarily in laboratory settings, they appear logically to be 
appropriate for international conflict settings as well. In fact, as indicated by the historical examples, 
many of the approaches have been applied in conflicts where mediational interventions have been 
employed. 
Each of the four roles of a facilitative mediator, while all passive in approach, move 
incrementally up the scale toward more active intervention. The Go-Between is merely a conduit for 
communication that cannot be accomplished through normal mechanisms. The Fact-Finder gathers 
and presents objective data about the dispute to the parties. The Counselor educates and advises. 
And the Sponsor engineers situations that facilitate direct communications among the conflicting 
parties. At each step, the mediator seeks to use his presence to make the communication, and hence 
the framework for convergence, more direct. 
One of the most valuable functions performed by facilitative mediation-and the use of good 
offices in particular-is toprevent serious conflict (Pechota, 1972). Its informal, non-evaluative, low 
publicity, and low risk nature is particularly suited to getting parties to discuss their problems early 
in a conflict setting, while they are still manageable. The propositional inventory emphasizes this 
conflict prevention theme. It focuses primarily on what can be done effectively to open and maintain 
communication channels and reassess and/or prevent misperceptions. 
Continuing research on facilitative mediation should take several forms: 
o Continue to develop the propositional inventory of effective implementation 
mechanisms by reviewing the experimental literature. 
o Conduct a systematic time-series assessment of the use of facilitative mediation 
techniques, their relative effectiveness, and the situational factors that promote their 
success or failure. 
o Match specific experimental findings with historical cases that illustrate the effective 
use of facilitative mediation approaches. 
o Conduct laboratory testing of the relative effectiveness and situational contingency of 
the four facilitative mediation roles through experimentation within realistic 
scenarios. 
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